By Ditmir Bushati/ Ten years after pro-EU protests erupted in Kiev's Maidan Square, because the then Ukrainian president refused to sign the association agreement with the EU , EU leaders, at the year-end meeting, took a decision of historic proportions: the opening of membership talks for Ukraine, hit by Russian aggression, and for Moldova, which has undertaken important reforms in the last two years. If this meeting ended without a decision on Ukraine, due to Hungary's opposition, the EU would look weak and the Commission would be accused of overpromising for Ukraine. The damage this would bring to the EU's reputation would be irreversible.
As a sign of encouragement, the EU also granted Georgia candidate country status. While Bosnia-Herzegovina took millimetric steps towards the negotiating table for EU membership. This is the first good news from the year-end meeting of EU leaders.
When the European Commission in June 2022 recommended candidate status for Ukraine and Moldova, it put forward seven and nine respectively. conditions to be met by these countries, in order to start EU membership talks. These conditions were mainly, but not exclusively, related to rule of law reforms. According to the enlargement package presented by the European Commission, on November 8, 2023, Ukraine has fulfilled only four of seven conditions and Moldova six of nine conditions. Georgia, on the other hand, has fulfilled only three of the twelve conditions set last summer.
Both the enlargement package and EU decision-making reflect a more favorable climate for enlargement, compared to previous years. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has revived the debate on enlargement and the future of the European project. Most EU member states see it as a way to respond to geopolitical reality and strengthen the EU in its immediate neighbourhood. However, it remains unclear whether EU enlargement will be able to materialize.
The trio of Eastern Neighborhood countries are under various forms of pressure and occupation by Russia. Thus, the decision-making of the EU defines not only a dividing line between the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian worlds, but at the same time proves that the EU's push for expansion is a strong geopolitical asset, due to its attractive power.
Unprecedentedly, the decision on Ukraine was taken under the conditions of Hungary's abstention, whose prime minister left the hall at the time of the decision, considering it a wrong decision on the part of the EU. On the other hand, Prime Minister Orbán prevented the EU's decision-making on the disbursement of much-needed funds for Ukraine, with the argument that such a thing brings consequences to the implementation of the planned EU projects for the citizens of his country.< /span>Developments in east of the continent are in stark contrast to the Western Balkans, where political elites have generally cultivated a sense of complacency in offering simple solutions to complex problems and the belief that they can cynically continue to tell the tale of EU membership without ownership on reforms that ensure essential transformation.The Western Balkans on the carouselThe fact is interesting. that the above decisions were received with enthusiasm and celebrations in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, while in Bosnia-Herzegovina with silence. the example of air travel applies. The status of the candidate country is more or less similar to the situation when we buy a ticket to travel. The decision to open negotiations with receiving the boarding pass and passing the police and physical control at the airport, which makes us ready for travel. While the approval of the negotiation framework is similar to the moment of boarding the plane. The negotiation process itself is a long flight with the hope and wish to reach the destination safely and without turbulence.The European Council granted Georgia the status of a candidate country, with the understanding that the steps set out in the recommendation of the European Commission, while Bosnia-Herzegovina will open membership negotiations after reaching the necessary degree of compliance with the membership criteria. The Council invites the Commission to report on the progress made by Bosnia-Herzegovina in this regard, no later than next March, with a view to taking a decision. This wording, accompanied by a defined deadline, places Bosnia-Herzegovina in front of the responsibility to fulfill the criteria listed by the European Commission in order to start the process of negotiations for EU membership.
Negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova will not start immediately. The EU leaders tasked the Council to approve the relevant negotiation frameworks after the European Commission's recommendations of November 8, 2023 are fulfilled. In other words, the decision of the European Council is a decision in principle. The European Commission must present a report on the fulfillment of the recommendations so that the EU member states can then unanimously approve the negotiating framework. A minimum of 70 unanimous decisions will be required over the next few years on Ukraine's path to EU membership.
The difference lies in the lack of political will, which is irreplaceable in this process. This is the reason that the Western Balkans continues to be on the carousel. As far from the EU as before the new geopolitical reality we live in, as a result of the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, despite the repetition of the two-sided warring rhetoric for the integration of the countries of the Western Balkans into the EU, as a two-way strategic goal.
The EU's joint meetings with the Western Balkans cannot cover the symbiosis of intellectual dishonesty that prevails in this process. Some of the countries of the region expect to be promoted by identifying the existing weaknesses of the EU itself, in relation to the protection and promotion of the rule of law. The unlocking of EU funds to Hungary, despite the collapse of rule of law standards, in exchange for allowing the decision to open negotiations with Ukraine, raises strong questions about the democratic and financial conditionality as an important element in the transformation process. democratic. If you add here the reports of the European Commission, which are more descriptive than diagnostic, it is clearly understood that the consolidation of the European project in this corner of Europe requires, above all, bilateral political will.
The facts speak clearly. Since 2017, when it closed three chapters of negotiations with the EU, Montenegro has not taken any further steps in this process. Despite being at the negotiating table with the EU for about a decade, Serbia continues to challenge the basic rules of the international order established in the region after the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, opposing in every way the citizenship of Kosovo, the functionality of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Mali Black. Photo of the December 17 parliamentary election victory rally, where the President of Serbia was accompanied by the President of Republika Srpska of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Speaker of the Parliament of Montenegro, the Minister of Security Affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as if they were part of the electoral team, speaks more than a thousand words.
The formalization of Greece's opposition to the opening of talks with Albania on the first group chapter that deals with the rule of law was an accident that should have been avoided . With the exception of a single episode in 1995, when Albania blocked the EU's financial aid package, due to Greece's objection regarding the "Peshkepia incident", the latter has always been supportive of Albania's European path. .
Vetoja është një aset i fuqishëm, por që përdoret rrallë në politikën e BE-së. Historia e fqinjëve na tregon se Greqia mund të shpenzojë kapital politiko-diplomatik deri në përmbushjen e objektivit, edhe pse e izoluar nga vendet e tjera anëtare të BE-së. Ndaj, nevojitet angazhim i njëmendtë politiko-diplomatik për tejkalimin e kësaj situatë, bazuar mbi parimet dhe vlerat europiane. Aq më tepër kur dihet se në muajin qershor të vitit 2018, Greqia ishte promotore e nisjes së bisedimeve për anëtarësim të Shqipërisë dhe Maqedonisë së Veriut në BE.
Horizonti për hapjen e bisedimeve për grup kapitullin e parë ana e Maqedonisë së Veriut mbetet i mbyllur, për shkak të zotimit të papërmbushur e të sanksionuar në kornizën negociuese, për të përfunduar ndryshimet kushtetuese. Me gjasë kjo temë delikate do të rimerret e trajtohet nga fituesit e zgjedhjeve parlamentare të pranverës së vitit të ardhshëm.
Ndërsa BE-ja nuk e ka shqyrtuar aplikimin e Kosovës për anëtarësim në BE, ndonëse ka kaluar një vit, pyetja që kërkon përgjigjë është se përse i mohohet Kosovës mundësia për të demonstruar vullnetin politik për transformim? A ka të bëjë kjo veç me pozicionin e ngurtë të pesëshes mosnjohëse ndaj Kosovës apo edhe me mungesën e kapacitetit të BE për të përfunduar projektet e shtetësisë në rajonin tonë?
Kontrasti tjetër mes lindjes dhe jugut të kontinentit është mënyra se si shikohet BE-ja nga elitat politike. Në Ukrainë e Moldavi ajo shikohet në mënyrë idilike, si një komunitet vlerash. Në Ballkanin Perëndimor shikohet si një mundësi se si BE-ja mund të “ballkanizohet” apo riformatohet, për shkak të kompromentimit të vlerave dhe standardeve të procesit të zgjerimit, sidomos gjatë dekadës së fundit.
Një hartë rruge për zgjerimin
Në këtë kontekst, lajmi i dytë i mirë nga mbledhja e fundvitit të udhëheqësve të BE-së është sigurimi i mbështetjes politike për procesin e reformimit të BE-së, krahas zgjerimit. Pra, angazhimi për miratimin e një udhërrëfyesi brenda verës së vitit të ardhshëm, për reformat që duhet të ndërmarrë BE-ja, për ta bërë atë gati për procesin e zgjerimit dhe qasjen që duhet të ndjekë me kandidatët që synojnë anëtarësimin.
Në Deklaratën e Granadës të 6 tetorit 2023, BE-ja theksoi se zgjerimi është një investim gjeostrategjik në paqe, siguri, stabilitet dhe prosperitet dhe një shtytës për përmirësimin e kushteve ekonomike dhe sociale të qytetarëve europianë, duke reduktuar pabarazitë ndërmjet vendeve dhe duke nxitur njëkohësisht respektimin e vlerave mbi të cilat është themeluar BE-ja.
Looking at the prospect of an enlarged EU with the six countries of the Western Balkans and the three countries of the Eastern Neighborhood, both the aspirants and the EU must be ready for the process and timing of membership. Work on both fronts must progress in parallel. Aspirants must show political will for reforms, especially in the area of the rule of law. While the EU member states must define the milestones of internal reforms by designing an EU with long-term ambitions, thus addressing key issues related to priorities and policies as well as the EU's capacity to act.< a i=1>The roadmap expected to be approved before the summer of next year should envisage the adoption of a series of reforms expected to be pushed forward during the Polish or Danish presidencies in 2025. A process similar in scope to the Agenda of Belini of 2000, which prepared the ground for the enlargement process of 2004.
Such an agenda is important to describe the main reforms for the EU budget, the replacement of unanimous voting with that of the qualified majority in some areas of EU policies, to make the latter ready for the enlargement process. The next EU budget 2028-2034 must precede the inclusion of new countries.
To realize the promise of a complete, free and peaceful Europe, a re-commitment to the values of liberal democracy is essential. Lasting prosperity can only follow on this necessary foundation. The EU must prove that the attitude of those who think they can manipulate the values and principles of the EU, the respect of which is a necessity for democratic transformation and sustainable economic development, is wrong.
